96
being the senior Military Officer assumed command of the troops
**Lieut Keyes, R. N. Commander of the Pine, brought ashore**
- an armed party of Blue Jackets.
About this time it became evident that offensive
action must be taken because darkness was approaching and the
enemy closing in and threatening an attack on our camp and
possibly a rush during the night.
The dispositions, under Captain Long's orders appear to have been admirably conceived and carried out, the result being that the camp was left in peace during the night.
Arrangements had been made to establish signalling
communications between Head Quarters and the Kowloon Pass,
and at about 8 p.m. a message reached you from Captain Berger
communicating the circumstances of the situation, and asking
for re-inforcements. Shortly afterwards I, as your Chief Staff
Officer, proceeded to Kowloon to order out 300 soldiers of the
Hong Kong Regiment under command of Lieut Colonel Retallick,
with directions to be at Shatin by daybreak on the 16th, and
expeditiously to push on to Taipo. Retallick started at 2 a.m.
arriving there at midday on the 16th. The route over the Kowloon Pass was bad marching and thence to Shatin also bad, but
it was known to Colonel Retallick and his officers so that no
serious difficulty was to be anticipated.
Captain I.
96
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*
being the senior Military Officer assumed command of the troops
**
Lieut Keyes, R. N. Commander of the Pane , brought ashore
→
- an armed party of Blue Jackets.
About this time it became evident that offensive
action must be taken because darkness was approaching and the
· enemy closing in and threatening an attack on our camp and
possibly a rush during the night..
The dispositions, under Captain Long's orders ap
pear to have been admirably conceived and carried out, the re-
sult being that the camp was left in peace during the night.
*
Arrangements had been made to establish signalling
: communications between Head Quarters and the Kowloon Pass,
and at about 8 p. m. a message reached you from Captain Berger
communicating the circumstances of the situation, and asking
for re-inforcements. Shortly afterwards I, as your Chief Staff
Officer, proceeded to Kowloon to order out 300 soldiers of the
HongKong Regiment under command of Lieut Colonel Retallick,
with directions to be at Shatin by daybreak on the 16th. and
expeditiously to push on te Taipo. Retallick started at 2 a.
arriving there at midday on the 16th. The route ever the Kow-
loon Pass was bad marching and thence to Shatin also bad, but
it was known to Colonel Retallick and his officers so that no
serious difficulty was to be anticipated.
Captain
I.
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